Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 42

Issue 2

Article 9

1992

Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. and
Lampv, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilvertson: Blurring the
Distinctions between the Securities Acts and among Securities
Claims
Laurie F. Humphrey

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Laurie F. Humphrey, Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. and Lampv, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilvertson: Blurring the Distinctions between the Securities Acts and among
Securities Claims, 42 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 659 (1992)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol42/iss2/9

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

RODRIGUEZ DE QUIJAS V.

SHEARSON/AMERICAN EXPRESS, INC.
AND LAMPF, PLEVA, LIPKIND,
PRUPIS & PETIGROW V.
GILBERTsON: BLURRING THE
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE
SECURITIES ACTS AND AMONG
SECURITIES CLAIMS
In recent years, the Supreme Court has addressed a number of
issues related to securities regulation. Tins comment focuses on the
Court's resolution of the issues raised in two recent cases. The
comment expresses no opinion about the "correctness" of the
Court's holdings. Rather, the comment exposes the flaws m the
Court's current method of resolving securities issues.'
Tis comment identifies two recent trends m the Supreme
Court's securities opinions. First, the Court uses selective provisions of the Securities Act of 19332 (the "Securities Act") and the
Securities Exchange Act of 19343 (the "Exchange Act") to find an
interlocking scheme aimed toward one purpose. Viewing the Acts
as a single regulatory structure, the Court then proceeds to apply
principles embodied m one of the Acts to a situation governed by
the other Act. Although both Acts contain anti-deception and disclosure provisions, the goals, the scope and the terms of the Acts
are not identical. The Court fails to acknowledge the umque features of each Act and to justify application of principles from one
Act to situations arising under the other.

I. As the scope of tluscomment is limited, discussion of the Court's rationale is

confined generally to the majority or plurality opiuon issued in each case.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811.
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Second, the Court follows a similar pattern in reviewing vanous claims stated under the Exchange Act. The Court assumes the
claims are sufficiently similar that principles applicable to one are
equally relevant to any other. Here too, the Court fails to acknowledge that the various causes of action within the Acts are distinct
and serve different purposes. As a result, the Court fails to justify
properly cross-application of principles underlying the various sections of the Exchange Act.
In 1933, Congress enacted the Securities Act to protect those
who invest in securities.4 The Securities Act is "cuefly concerned
with disclosure and fraud in connection with offerings of securities."5 The Act requires certain persons connected with the sale of
a security to "make full and fair disclosure of the character of
securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and to prevent
fraud in their sale." 6 Various sections of the Act define the requisite extent of disclosure and provide for enforcement through pnvate causes of action.7
The Exchange Act, enacted in 1934, also contains antideception provisions' designed to induce sellers to disclose certain
information. However, the Exchange Act is "chiefly concerned with
the regulation of post-distribution trading on the Nation's stock exchanges and securities trading markets." 9 Congress stated that:
a national public interest
makes it necessary to provide
for regulation and control of [transactions conducted upon
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets],
to
require appropriate reports, to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechamsms of a national market sys10
tem
Congress also noted that prices established by the markets are
widely relied upon and are "susceptible to mampulation and control." The Exchange Act, therefore, is intended primarily to regulate the securities exchanges and the transactions involving securities registered on those exchanges.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).
Blue Clp Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975).
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431 (citing Preamble to Securities Act, 48 StaL 74 (1933)).
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 728.
See, e.g., Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
Blue Clp Stamps, 421 U.S. at 752.
Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
Id. §§ 2(2)-(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b(2)-(3).
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In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the
Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of clauses requirng
parties to arbitrate future controversies which might give rise to
clainms under the Securities Act.2 Overruling Wilko v. Swan, 3
the Court held that predispute arbitration clauses are enforceable
under the Securities Act. 14 In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkznd, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, the Court read the statute of limitations
expressly stated by Congress in section 9 of the Exchange Act into
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which does not contain its own
limitations provision. 5 While the exact issues of these cases differ, the incomplete analysis employed by the Court to resolve each
case is similar.
This comment reviews the Rodriguez de Quijas and Lampf
decisions and exposes the flaws in the Court's resolution of these
cases. First, the cases central to an understanding of the current
state of law are set forth briefly in chronological order. Next, this
comment criticizes the Court's analogies between the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act. Finally, tus comment attacks the Court's
tendency to dispense with the differences among distinct causes of
action available under the Acts.
I. BACKGROUND
A brief review of the Supreme Court's opinions in several
securities cases aids in the analysis of Rodriquez de Quijas and
Lampf.
A.

Wilko v.

Swan

In 1953, the Supreme Court was asked to decide in Wilko v.
Swan whether or not a predispute arbitration clause in an agreement relating to the purchase of securities executed between a
brokerage firm and its customers could be enforced consistent with
the Securities Act. 6 The customers filed a claim in district court
alleging that the firm had made misrepresentations about the value
of certain stock in violation of section 12(2) of the Securities
Act.7 The brokerage firm had moved in the lower court for a
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

490 U.S. 477, 478 (1989).
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Rodnguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485.
111 S. CL 2773, 2782 n.9 (1991).
346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953).
Id at 428-29. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act provides:
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stay of the proceedings, claiming that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the agreement. The Wilko
Court held that section 14 of the Securities Act, winch prohibits
waivers of certain provisions of the Act, operated to void enforcement of the arbitration clause." Reasoning that an agreement to
arbitrate disputes was a 'stipulation' for purposes of section 14, the
Court stated that "the right to select the judicial forum is the land
of 'provision' [of the Securities Act] that cannot be waived." 9
The Court supported its decision by referring to the purposes
and goals of the Securities Act. The Court first noted that section
12(2) would govern the dispute regardless of the forum in winch
the dispute was resolved.2" It also stated that the Securities Act,
drafted to protect buyers, granted buyers particular advantages not
available under common law; the Act gives buyers a broader
choice of court and venue and shifts to sellers the burden of proof
regarding a seller's culpability 2'In addition, the Court found no
meaningful opportumty existed for judicial review of an arbitration
award.22 Finally, the Court noted that the buyer, in executing an

Any person who (2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by
the provisions of section [3] of this title, other than paragraph (2)
of subsection (a) of said section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or commuication in interstate commerce
or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication,
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission),
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue
either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover
the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount
of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Securities Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
18. Willko, 346 U.S. at 431. Section 14 of the Securities Act provides, 'Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Securities Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n.
19. Wi/ko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
20. Id at 434.
21. Id at 435.
22. See it at 436-37.
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agreement containing a predispute arbitration clause, relinquishes
the advantages provided by the Act at a time when the buyer "is
less able to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act
places on [the buyer's] adversary " The Court therefore decided
that the policies embodied in the Securities Act evidenced Congressional intent to supersede other statutory provisions favoring arbitration. 24
B. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,' the Supreme Court considered the plaintiff's burden in proving a defendant's culpability in
an action under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 6 and under
Rule 10b-527 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). The Court rejected the argument that proof of
negligence, sufficient to support a claim under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act, is also sufficient to support a claim arising under

23.
24.
25.
26.

IX at 435.
Id. at 438.
425 U.S. 185, 187-88 (1976).
Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use

of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance m contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
27. Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

17 C.F.RL § 240.10b-5 (1991).
While neither section 10(b) nor Rule 1Ob-5 contains an express cause of action, a
cause of action has been implied under these sections since 1946. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:659

section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.2" After discussing the differing purposes served by the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act, the Court observed that the Acts "constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in securities. "2 9 The Court then reasoned that procedural
restrictions governing a section 12(2) suit, but not applicable in a
10(b) claim, indicated that the causes of action are not interchangeable.3" The Court therefore concluded that the differences between
section 12(2) and section 10(b) justified different levels of scienter
for the two claims. 3
C. Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc. v. McMahon
In Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Court
considered whether a predispute arbitration clause was void under
the Exchange Act.3 2 Plaintiffs, clients of a brokerage firm, asserted claims under section 10(b) and under Rule 10b-5. The Court,
33
construing language similar to section 14 of the Securities Act,
decided that section 29 of the Exchange Act prohibited waiver only
of compliance with a duty created under the Exchange Act. 4 Because the right to sue in federal court relates to procedure and
creates no duty with which sellers must comply, the right to
choose a forum could be waived.35
The McMahon Court harmomzed its decision with Wilko by
distinguishing the setting in wluch arbitration arose. It viewed
Wilko as involving a situation where arbitration was inadequate to
redress grievances. 36 A corollary to that rule would hold Wilko
inapposite where arbitration is adequate for resolving grievances.37
Thus, determination of the waiver issue turned on the adequacy of
arbitration. Since Wilko had been decided, Congress had granted

28. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210.
29. Id at 206.
30. Id at 210.
31. Id at 210-11.
32. 482 U.S. 220, 222 (1986).
33. See supra note 18. The relevant portion of section 29 of the Exchange Act provides, "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance
with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule
of an exchange required thereby shall be void." Exchange Act § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. §
78cc(a).
34. 482 U.S. at 228.
35. Id
36. Id at 229.
37. Id
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the SEC broad powers to regulate arbitration procedures employed
by self-regulatory organizations ("SRO"). 38 The agreement at issue
in McMahon required arbitration to be conducted according to the
rules of one of the SROs. The Court reasoned that "where the SEC
has sufficient statutory authority to ensure that arbitration is adequate to vindicate Exchange Act rights, enforcement [of the arbitration clause] does not effect a waiver." 39 Therefore the Court refused to extend Wilko to the Exchange Act in light of the SEC's
expanded statutory power.'
D. Rodnguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc.
In Rodnguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAmencan Express, Inc., the
Court again addressed the enforceability of predispute arbitration
clauses under the Securities Act.4" Plaintiffs filed suit against their
broker asserting claims under section 12(2) of the Securities Act
and under three sections of the Exchange Act.42 The district court

ordered the Exchange Act claims submitted to arbitration (per
McMahon) and ordered the section 12(2) claim tried in court (per
Wilko)4 3 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed after
concluding that Wilko had been reduced to "obsolescence" by subsequent Supreme Court decLsions." The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.4 5
The Rodnguez de Quijas Court overruled Wlko, holding that
predispute arbitration clauses could be enforced consistent with the

38. IX. at 238. See Exchange Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (providing for the SEC's

oversight powers). The Exchange Act defines a self-regulatory organization as -any national securities exchange, registered securities association, or registered clearing agency
" Exchange Act § 3(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(26). In 1975, Congress revamped a
number of sections, including section 19 of the Exchange Act. See Pub. L. No. 94-29,
89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as amended im scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a78aa). Prior to 1975, the SEC's power to oversee SRO rules was limited to rules addressing specific subjects not including arbitration. See The Exchange Act, ch. 404, § 19,
48 Stat. 881, 898-99 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78s). The 1975 act both
expanded and clarified the SEC's oversight powers, but no specific reference to arbitration procedures appears. See Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16, 89 Stat. at 146.
39. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
40. IX at 234.
41. 490 U.S. 477, 479 (1988).
42. Id
43. id.
44. Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlLehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th
Cir. 1988).
45. Rodnquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 488 U.S. 954 (1988).
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Securities Act." Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy advanced
a number of justifications for the decision, including (1) a determnation that the Wilko decision "rested on suspicion of arbitration as
a method of weakening the protections afforded in the [Securities
Act]"47 and (2) a conclusion that the coexistence of Wlko and
McMahon would undermine the principle of harmomous construction of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.4"
Addressing the contention that Wlko should be upheld, the
Court observed that to the extent that the Wlko decision rested on
a suspicion of the adequacy of arbitration, the decision was not
aligned with current statutory and judicial support of arbitration.49
The Court referred to its rationale for rejecting the inadequacy of
arbitration argument in McMahon as being partially grounded in
the SEC's power to regulate the procedures employed in securities
arbitration.5 ° However, the Rodriguez de Quijas Court refused to
repeat the arguments supporting McMahon, and it stated that the
petitioners had failed to carry their
burden of showing that arbitra51
tion clauses were not enforceable.
The Court then proceeded to discuss its position that overruling
Wilko was justified by the disparity between that decision and
McMahon. The Rodriguez de Quijas Court stated:
It also would be undesirable for the decisions in Wilko
and McMahon to continue to exist side by side. Their
inconsistency is at odds with the principle that the [Securities] and [Exchange] Acts should be construed harmomously because they "constitute interrelated components of the
federal regulatory scheme govering transactions in securi46. Rodriguez de Qu~ias, 490 U.S. at 485.
47. Id at 481.
48. Id at 484-85.
49. Id at 481.
50. Id at 483.
51. Id The Court did not address the brokerage firm's burden of persuading the
Court to overrule precedent. Compare Justice Kennedy's view of precedent in Rodnquez
de Quijas with his opinion on the subject in another case:
We have said
that the burden borne by the party advocating the
abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the Court is asked
to overrule a point of statutory construction. Considerations of stare decists
have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here,
the
legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we
have done.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Umon, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) (addressing the request
to overrule precedent related to discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
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ties" In this case, for example, petitioners' claims under
the [Exchange] Act were subjected to arbitration, while
their claim under the [Securities] Act was not permitted to
go to arbitration, but was required to proceed in court. That
result makes little sense for similar claims, based on similar
facts, which are supposed to arise within a single federal
regulatory scheme. In addition, the inconsistency between
Wilko and McMahon undermines the essential rationale for
a harmomous construction of the two statutes, which is to
discourage litigants from manipulating their allegations
merely to cast their claims under one of the securities laws
rather than another.52

E. Lampf, Pleva, Lzpkan4 Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson
In 1991, the Court decided Lampf, Pleva, Lpland, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, which raised the Issue of which statute of
limitations to apply to causes of actions implied under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.51 The Court decided that a uniform statute
of limitations was preferable to application of various state law
statutes of limitation.' It then held that the statute of limitations
expressly set forth in section 9 of the Exchange Act was the appropriate statute to apply to a section 10(b) clan. 5 5 Therefore,
actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must be commenced
within one year of discovery of the violation, but no later than
three years after the conduct which constituted the alleged violation.56
The Court justified its decision by relying on congressional
intent. First, the Court observed that Congress provided for two
the one
statutes of limitations in the Exchange Act which involved
57
1
year from discovery/three years from conduct scheme.
[Section] 9,
pertaining to the willful manipulation of
relating to misleading
stock prices, and [section] 18,
filings, target the precise dangers that are the focus of [sec52. 490 U.S. at 484-85 (citation omitted) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hocbfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 206 (1976)).
53. Ill S. Ct. 2773, 2777 (1991). For the text of § 10(b) and Rule iOb-5 and a
summary of the cause of action implied m them, see supra notes 26-27.
54. Lampf, Ii1

S. Ct. at 2780.

55. Id at 2780-81.
56. Id at 2782.
57. Id at 2781.
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tion] 10(b). Each is an integral element of a complex web
of regulations. Each was intended to facilitate a central
goal: "to protect investors against mampulation of stock
prices through regulation of transactions upon securities
exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose
regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is
listed on national securities exchanges.""8
Second, the Court noted that Congress amended the Securities
Act when it enacted the Exchange Act.59 The amendments adopted a similar one year/three year scheme for causes of action arising
under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act.' Extension61of this
scheme to the Securities Act bolstered the Court's decision.
Reasoning that Congress had provided express limitation provisions elsewhere in the Exchange Act, the Court refused to analyze
whether the statutes of limitation applicable to state law causes of
action similar to a section 10(b) claim were the more appropriate
statutes to apply 62 Because the section 9 and section 18 linutation
clauses "differ slightly in terminology," the Court selected the
language of section 9 to apply to section 10(b) claims. 63

58. Id at 2781 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)).
59. Id at 2780.
60. Id Section 13 of the Securities Act provides:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under
section [11] or section [12(2)]
unless brought within one year after the
discovery of the untrue statement or the oussion, or after such discovery
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the
action is to enforce a liability created under section [12(1)]
, unless
brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based. In no
event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created under
section [11 or section 12(1)]
more than three years after the security was
bona fide offered to the public, or under section [12(2)]
more than three
years after the sale.
Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m.
61. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780.
62. Id at 2781-82. Six months after Lampf was decided, Congress amended the
Exchange Act to provide that state law limitations apply to private causes of action
under § 10(b). See Pub. L. No. 102-242, tit. IV, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2287 (1991).
63. Id at 2782 n.9. Compare Exchange Act § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) ("No action
shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless brought
within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within
three years after such violation.") with id § 18(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) ("No action shall
be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section unless brought within
one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and within three
years after such cause of action accrued.").
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II. ANALYSIS
The remainder of this comment uses the foregoing cases to
demonstrate the shortcomings of the current Supreme Court's
analysis of securities law. First, this section exposes the mappropriate analogies drawn between the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act. This discussion focuses on- the Rodriguez de Quijas decision
and its forerunners. Second, the flawed analogies drawn between
distinct claims within each Act are illustrated by analyzing the
Lampf Court's reliance on section 9 of the Exchange Act to decide
an issue presented under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. The
comment then concludes that the Supreme Court's practice blurs
the distinctions which are meant to exist between the Acts and the
claims that can be stated under them.
A.

Comparisons of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act

As previously stated, in Rodriguez de Quijas the Supreme
Court overruled precedent and held that predispute arbitration
clauses are enforceable under the Securities Act. 65 The Court rested its conclusion on two grounds: (1) the McMahon Court had
adequately disposed of the Wilko Court's belief that arbitration was
an inadequate forum m which to resolve securities disputes 66 and
(2) the inconsistency between the Wilko and McMahon decisions
was undesirable under an enforcement scheme intended to be construed harmomously ' Each of these justifications arise from mcomplete comparisons of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
With respect to the bias against arbitration underlying Wilko,
the Rodriguez de Quijas Court stated:
[W]e explained at length [in McMahon] why we rejected the Wlko Court's aversion to arbitration as a forum for
resolving disputes over securities transactions, especially m
light of the relatively recent expansion of the [SEC]'s
authority to oversee and to regulate those arbitration proce68
dures.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See supra text accompanying notes 41-52.
Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989).
Id at 481.
Id at 484-85.
Id at 483.
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It then refused to repeat those arguments.6 9 An analysis of the
McMahon decision and of the differences between the Acts highlights the defects of the Supreme Court's analysis.
In McMahon, the Supreme Court chose to decide whether
Wilko, which prohibited enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses for clamis under the Securities Act, should be extended to
claims under the Exchange Act. The McMahon Court noted that
recently enacted SEC powers led to a conclusion about the adequacy of arbitration at variance with the finding in Wilko.7" Where
the SEC had statutory authority to ensure the adequacy of the SRO
arbitration procedures, enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses
did not undermine enforcement of claims under the Exchange
Act.71 The Rodriguez de Quijas Court, by referring to its discussion of arbitration in McMahon, presumably meant, to subsume all
elements of its argument in the McMahon decision into the Rodriguez decision.72
The Court's failure to restate the McMahon arguments is unfortunate for two reasons. First, the exercise of restating the arguments may have caused the Court to realize that features distinct to
the Exchange Act were dispositive in McMahon. Second, if the
Court had recognized the distinction between the Exchange Act and
the Securities Act, it would have been forced to justify properly its
reversal of Wilko.
The Wlko Court offered a number of reasons for its determination that arbitration was an inadequate basis for redressing
grievances arising under the Securities Act. 73 The Rodriguez de
Quijas Court did not expressly address the shortcomings identified
in Wilko, assuming instead that arguments about the inadequacy of
arbitration to resolve securities conflicts were disposed of in
McMahon. The McMahon decision, however, considered claims
brought under the Exchange Act by a customer against its brokerage firm, and it emphasized the SEC's power to regulate SRO
rules.74 Though the facts in Wilko were similar, the claims assert-

69. Id
70. Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1986).
71. Id.
72. See Rodnguez de Quias, 490 U.S. at 483 ("We need not repeat those arguments
here"). See supra text accompanying notes 32-40 for the major elements of the
McMahon argument.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
74. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 222. while the Exchange Act grants the SEC authonty to regulate the rule-making ability of SROs, Exchange Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s, the
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ed arose under the Securities Act.
The Court does not seem to realize that not every securities
transaction must involve an SRO or an arbitration clause that incorporates SRO rules. As a result, the McMahon reasoning is underdeveloped, especially in the context of the Securities Act under
winch a plaintiff need not be involved with an SRO. Because the
Rodrguez de Quijas Court failed to acknowledge the differences
between the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, it also failed to
take the next logical step and reconcile these differences in a manner justifying a complete expansion of the McMahon decision to a
dispute arising under the Securities Act, typically under section
12(2) of that Act.
Rodrguez de Quijas seems to dictate enforcement of an arbitration clause related to a section 12(2) claim, winch does not
require the security at issue to be registered.75 While it may be
assumed that most brokerage firm contracts will incorporate by
reference in the arbitration clause the rules of an SRO, it is also
conceivable that a transaction involving unregistered securities
would not involve an SRO. In addition, the purchase agreement
relating to an unregistered security could contain a predispute arbitration clause which does not specify application of SRO rules.
Is the latter a situation in winch arbitration would be inadequate
and an arbitration clause therefore unenforceable? McMahon rested
on the Court's belief that SEC oversight of SRO arbitration rules
was sufficient to ensure the adequacy of arbitration conducted
pursuant to such rules. Instead of expanding McMahon narrowly so
that it applies to those claims arising under the Securities Act in
winch certain facts suggest the adequacy of arbitration, the Rodriguez de Quijas Court blithely expanded McMahon to all disputes
arising under the Securities Act. 6

SEC does not have the power to review application of SRO rules in any particular arbitration. See id. at 265 (Blackaun, J., dissenting). Thus, implicit m McMahon's reliance
on SEC oversight are the presumptions that SRO rules will be properly applied and,
even more fundamentally, that SRO rules will be chosen to govern an arbitration.
The arbitration clauses at issue in both Rodnquez de Quijas and McMahon specified
that the rules of a particular SRO would apply in an arbitration proceeding. Rodnquez
de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 478; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223. Whether the Court's analysis
would change if the arbitration clause did not require application of SRO rules remains
an issue.

75. See supra notes 17, 26.
76. Furthermore, the Rodnguez de Quias Court never explained why the Wilko
Court's concerns about arbitration were outdated. "Even those who favor the arbitration
of securities claims do not contend, however, that arbitration has changed so significantly
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In addition, the Rodriguez de Quijas Court found that the coexistence of the inconsistent Wilko and McMahon decisions undermined harmomous construction of interrelated regulatory components. 77 The Court not only misconstrued the Hochfelder decision,
which it relied upon to reach the harmiomous construction conclusion, but it also exhibited a flawed understanding of the mterrelationship of the Acts and of the strategies involved in choosing the
form a securities action will take.
The Hochfekler Court determined the requisite level of scienter
a plaintiff must prove to succeed in a section 10(b) action."
Starting with the statute itself, the Court held that the language of
section 10(b) (and of Rule lOb-5) required the plaintiff to prove
more than negligence on the part of the defendant to prevail.79
While the Hochfelder Court reviewed both the Securities and Exchange Acts and stated that the Acts constituted "interrelated components," the Court did not blindly apply the negligence standard
of fault required under section 12(2) to claims arising under section
10(b)."0 The Hochfelder Court instead concluded that while procedural limitations on a section 12(2) claun justified the lower scienter level for that cause of action, the absence of those limitations
in a section 10(b) claim compelled the Court to find that a 10(b)
claim required a different, higher level of scienter. The Court refused to extend liability under section 10(b) to negligent wrongdoing.' The Hochfelder Court reviewed sections of each Act extensively, thoughtfully compared elements of the Acts, analyzed the
differences found and justified its decision to require a lugher level
of scienter for section 10(b) claims despite the similarity of section
10(b) and section 12(2) claims.82 In contrast, the Rodriguez de
Quijas Court failed even to inquire whether or not differences
between the Acts might justify the co-existence of the seemingly
contradictory Wilko and McMahon decisions. As is apparent from
the Hochfelder holding, "harmonious construction" does not necessarily require that similar provisions be construed as though they

as to eliminate the essential charactenstics noted by the Wilko Court" McMahon, 482
U.S. at 259 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. See supra text accompanying note 52.
78. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
79. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210.
80. Id at 206, 210.
81. Id
82. Id at 207-09.
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were identical.
The Rodnguez de Quijas Court was also concerned that the
coexistence of the two decisions would increase the probability that
plaintiffs would manipulate their claims to take advantage of
Wilko's prohibition on arbitration of claims under the Securities
Act. 83 Admittedly, the Hochfelder Court was also concerned with
the possibility of claim mampulation. The Hochfelder Court refused
to extend the remedy implied in section 10(b) "to actions prermsed
on negligence" because it feared "[s]uch extension would allow
causes of action covered by [sections] 11, 12(2), and 15 [of the
Securities Act] to be brought instead under [section] 10(b) and
thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural
restrictions on these express actions."" The difference between the
Rodnquez de Quijas and Hochfelder decisions, however, is a difference of kind.
The Hochfelder Court was concerned that extending liability
under section 10(b) to a negligent defendant would eliminate the
distinctions drawn by the similar express claims under the Securities Act. A plaintiff, however, can still choose to bring a claim
which would satisfy the elements of section 10(b) under section
12(2) instead, so long as the claim also satisfies the elements of
the latter section. Should a plaintiff choose a section 12(2) claim,
the plaintiff accepts the procedural limitations discussed by the
Hochfelder Court. Similarly, should the plaintiff choose to pursue
a section 10(b) claim, the plaintiff must establish each element of
that claim, including the requisite level of scienter. Variations
among the elements of alternate theories of liability and plaintiffs'
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of evidence necessary
to establish those elements determine which causes of action will
be pursued. The availability of a particular remedy or a specific
damage formula or an alternative method of resolving a dispute
such as arbitration may influence plaintiffs' choice of actions.
Congress and the courts implicitly sanction these decisions when
they create rights of action (Congress by statute and the courts by
identifying implied rights of action) wuch have elements overlapping those in other causes of action. For example, the judiciallycreated 10(b) claim has elements both similar and dissimilar to the
express various claims contained in the Securities Act and the

83. Rodnquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
84. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210.
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Exchange Act.
The failure of the Rodriguez de Quijas Court to address the
distinctions between the Securities Act and the Exchange Act results in an unprincipled holding. While the Hochfelder decision
involved extensive analysis of how the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act serve as "interrelated components," the Rodriguez de
Quijas Court appears to suggest that "interrelated" is equivalent to
"identical" and that inconsistencies in applying the Acts to a given
situation are patently undesirable. The Hochfelder Court, under a
Rodriguez de Quijas-type analysis, should have concluded that
section 10(b) requires only that a plaintiff show mere negligence
on the part of the defendant and then should have incorporated the
procedural limitations associated with a section 12(2) action into a
section 10(b) claim. After all, inconsistent procedural treatment
"makes little sense for similar claims, based on similar facts, which
are supposed to arise within a single federal regulatory scheme."8 5
As long as different claims address the same conduct, the Rodriguez de Quijas Court seems to favor similar treatment and similar
disposition notwithstanding variations in the applicable law8 6
B.

Different Claims Arising Under the Same Act

Perhaps Rodriguez de Quijas could be viewed as an aberration
from the Supreme Court's generally competent analysis and disposition of securities law issues. The Lampf decision, however, appears to remove any doubt that the Rodriguez de Quijas decision
was a precursor to incomplete analyses of securities law issues. In
the same manner in which the Rodriguez de Quijas Court drew
broad comparisons between the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act, the Lampf Court drew broad comparisons between two sections of the Exchange Act.8 7 The Lampf Court considered the stat-

85. Rodrquez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485.
86. A further problem with the Rodriguez de Quijas decision arises from the Court's
paternalistic treatment of the plaintiff, whom the Court characterizes as being forced to
pursue similar claims based on similar facts in two separate forums. The Court's facially
paternalistic statement should not fool the careful reader who recognizes that the plaintiff
is precisely the party who wanted to avoid arbitration of all of its claims or, at least, its
§ 12(2) claim. The Court, without acknowledging the result, in fact aided the defendant
who wanted to submit to arbitration all clans arising from the same conduct.
87. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy, who wrote the Rodriguez de Qu~ias opinon for a
nearly unanimous court, dissented from the Lampf decision, attacking primarily the
Court's interjection of express limitation provisions from other sections of the Act without reconciling their disparate purposes and rationales. Lampf, Pleva, Lipland, Prupis &
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ute of limitations applicable to a section 10(b) clan, and ultimately held that the limitations provisions expressly stated in section 9
of the Exchange Act would apply to the causes of action implied
in section 10 of the same act."8 Regardless of whether or not one
believes the ultimate holding is correct, the reasoning by wuch the
Court reached this holding is seriously flawed.
The Court first stated that both sections 9 and section 18 of
the Exchange Act, each of which contain a limitations provision
which includes the one year/three year scheme, were intended to
serve the same function - protecting investors from manipulation
of stock prices by regulating the stock exchanges and requiring
intermittent reporting of companies whose stock is listed on those
exchanges. 9 Without examining and analyzing the similarities and
differences between sections 9 and 10(b), the Court determined that
section 10(b) addresses the same dangers and that the section 9
statute of limitations applies to claims under section 10(b) claims
as well."°
Obvious distinctions exist between sections 9 and 10(b).9"
Section 9 prohibits a wide range of activities, most of which relate
to securities listed on a national stock exchange.' In contrast,
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit fraud and misrepresentations
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, whether or
not registered on a national stock exchange. 93 Furthermore, while
certain securities are exempted from the provisions of section 9,
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, III S. CL 2773, 2789 (1991). Significantly, the explicit limitations provisions in the Securities Act are each unique. But, according to Justice Kennedy,
"[i]t is of even greater unportance to note that both of the statutes in question relate to
express causes of action which in their purpose and underlying rationale differ from
causes of action implied under § 10(b)." Id at 2789. Apparently, Justice Kennedy holds
sacrosanct the express terms of statutory causes of action, but compromises us adherence
to express terms when they create differences between the Securities Act and the Exchange AcL
See also supra note 51 for an example of Justice Kennedy's confusing view of
precedent.
88. Lampf, III S. CL at 2782 n.9.
89. Id at 2781.
90. Id
91. Because of the limited scope of tlus comment, the differences set forth here are
demonstrative, not exhaustive.
92. See Exchange Act § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (relating to activities wuch affect
national securities exchange stock pnces and pnce-related misrepresentations made to
induce sales or purchases); td § 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (governing the sales of any
put, call, straddle or other option or privilege by use of a national securities exchange).
93. Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see also Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§240.10b-5.
94. Exchange Act § 9(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f). The term "exempted securities" is a
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section 10(b) applies to all securities without exception.95 Therefore, section 10(b) is not confined to the narrow goal of preventing
manipulation of stock prices listed on the national securities exchanges.
Substantial differences also exist between section 18 and section 10(b). Section 18 prohibits misrepresentations m documents
required to be filed pursuant to the Exchange Act. 97 Section
10(b), m contrast, prohibits all actionable misrepresentations whether or not contained in a document subject to the Act's filing requirements. 98 Section 18 covers only affirmative statements which
are false or which are misleading under the circumstances surrounding the statement;99 section 10(b) may apply to mere silence
as well."re
As the foregoing comparisons illustrate, the scope of section
10(b) and of Rule 10b-5 is both broader and narrower than sections 9 and 18. The range of transactions or conduct to which
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply extends beyond registered securities, beyond misrepresentations contained mndocuments filed with
the SEC and beyond conduct associated with a stock listed on a
national securities exchange. On the other hand, section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 do not expressly apply to certain conduct prohibited
under section 9 ff the conduct itself does not involve misrepresentations or a fraudulent scheme. 01'
The Lampf Court, without acknowledging the existence of these
differences or attempting to reconcile the differences with the specific purpose of each section, nonetheless concludes that section 10

defined term which includes government securities, municipal securities and certain trust
fund interests. Id § 3(a)(12)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12)(A).
95. l § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) ("the purchase and sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered"). See also Supenntendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971) ("the fact that the
transaction is not conducted through a securities exchange or an organized over-the-counter market is irrelevant to the coverage of § 10(b)").
96. Because of the limited scope of this comment, the differences set forth here are
demonstrative, not exhaustive.
97. See Exchange Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a).
98. See supra note 27 for the text of Rule 10b-5.
99. Exchange Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a).
100. See Cluarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (noting that silence in
connection with the sale or purchase of a security is actionable under section 10(b) if a
relationship of trust and confidence between the parties gives rise to a duty to disclose).
101. See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) ("The language
of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving
manipulation or deception.").
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is directed at the precise evils to which sections 9 and 18 are
directed."° Further, having decided that the sections serve the
same goal, the Court fails to consider how each section may serve
that same goal in different ways. Because of the Court's simplistic
view of the securities laws, its analysis of Issues presented in
Lampf was incomplete and its conclusion unsupported.
The Supreme Court's recent securities decisions reveal its inability or unwillingness to construe the securities laws to effectuate
provisions unique to each but nonetheless similar to companion
laws. Despite the distinctions between the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act and among their respective claims, the Supreme
Court contends that the purposes of the Acts and of the claims are
identical. Further, the Court employs tis identical purpose, or
interrelationship, to justify facile decisions in which distinctions
warranting different results among related claims are effectively
interpreted out of existence. One must wonder how much time will
elapse before judicial interpretation effectively merges the two Acts
and their various claims into a single Act containing one claim.
LAURIE F HUMPHREY

102. Lampf, Ill S. Ct. at 2781.

